This paper explores the linkage between corporate risk management strategies, investment, and economic stability in an open economy with a flexible exchange rate regime. Firms use currency futures contracts to manage their exchange rate exposure -caused by balance sheet effects as in Krugman (2000) -and therefore their investments' sensitivity to currency risk. We find that, depending on whether futures contracts are used for risk reduction (i.e., hedging) or risk taking (i.e., speculation), the implied magnitudes of recessions and booms are decreased or increased. Corporate risk management can therefore substantially affect economic stability on the macrolevel.
Introduction
In this paper we investigate the implications of corporate risk management in a balance sheet-triggered currency crises model as it was introduced in the literature by Krugman (1999 Krugman ( , 2000 . First, we investigate the real-financial interface on the microeconomic level. Firms' investment policies are assumed to depend on foreign currency denominated debt. The value of this debt (measured in domestic currency)
is thus subject to exchange rate fluctuations. The higher the debt burden measured in domestic currency, the less the firms can invest, due to the operation of credit constraints. Second, we explore the relevance of these microeconomic factors for macroeconomic stability in a flexible exchange rate regime. A currency crisis (i.e. a steep devaluation of the domestic currency) will increase firms' debt burden and, therefore, have a deleterious effect on investment due to its financing conditions. Significantly decreasing investment leads in turn to large output losses, as described by the IS equilibrium relationship or a dynamic multiplier process.
Hence, we have a feedback chain leading from large devaluations via the foreigndebt burden of firms and their investment possibilities to macroeconomic activity and employment. In this basic situation, we give in this paper -compared to Flaschel and Semmler (2006) -the firms an instrument to interrupt the feedback channel right at the beginning. We assume that firms can trade currency futures to influence their investment's exposure to currency risk. In the literature, widespread corporate use of derivative securities is well documented. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995, p. 743-744) point out that the demand for risk management vehicles by corporations was an important component of the "explosion in financial innovation" that has occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. There are a number of reasons for firms to implement such hedging strategies.
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However, firms have also incentives to speculate.
2 Risk management, in our approach, therefore comprises strategies for risk reduction as well as strategies for risk taking.
There are several articles investigating the link between demand for financial derivatives by corporations and firms' investment policies.
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However, there is rarely any literature dealing with the implications of the 'financing-risk management-investment' interface for macroeconomic behavior. This paper therefore examines the impact of risk management strategies on aggregate investment and on aggregate demand and output. We show that the magnitude of potential recessions and booms significantly depends on whether corporations use financial derivatives for hedging or for speculation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a Flaschel and Semmler (2006) type Mundell-Fleming-Tobin (MFT) model adjusted to allow for the treatment of Krugman (2000) type currency crises situations. Section 3 introduces linear hedging and speculation into the model and considers their implications. Section 4 presents simulation results implied by our modification of the MFT approach to macroeco-1 See e.g. Stulz (1984) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , Fung and Leung (1991), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) , Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) , Beatty (1999) , and Albuquerque (2003) .
2 See e.g. Guay (1999) .
nomics. In addition to hedging and speculation, the role of futures trading costs and the impact of capital flights is also investigated. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The basic Krugman version of the MFT model
The basic model is a marriage of a traditional Mundell-Fleming model with a portfolio approach "which owes much to Tobin"
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. The model consists of a goods market equilibrium curve (an IS curve) and the a financial markets equilibrium curve (called AA curve). We characterize equilibrium in the goods market by the condition that production Y must be equal to aggregate demand, i.e., to the sum of consumption C, investment I, government expenditure G, and net exports N X:
Consumption and government expenditures are defined as customary in an IS relationship. The representation of investment and net exports needs some explanation.
As usual, net exports depend negatively on domestic output Y and positively on foreign outputȲ * . The main feature of the model is therefore the interface between the responses of investment (here assumed to depend negatively on the exchange rate as in Krugman (2000) ) and net exports to exchange rate changes. A depreci-4 Rødseth (2000, p. 169) with a modified investment behavior of firms as introduced in Krugman (2000) .
5 This equation can be reduced to an equation representing the domestic goods market solely if the domestic absorption of foreign goods is cancelled against the import component in the net export function. ation of the domestic currency which is equivalent of a rise in the price of foreign exchange will make domestic goods more competitive. Ceteris paribus, net exports will increase (N X e > 0) if the Marshall-Lerner conditions are assumed to hold. If this is the only effect on the goods market, the IS curve will be upward sloping in the output -exchange rate phase space. Yet investment is here assumed to depend on the exchange rate as well. Krugman (2000) introduces an investment function where firms have substantial debts denominated in foreign currency. A depreciation of the domestic currency will increase their debt, measured in domestic currency, and therefore worsen the balance sheets of these firms. These balance sheet problems will lead the firmsvoluntarily or unvoluntarily -to cut back investment (I e < 0). Figure 1 The nonlinearity of the investment function allows for the possibility of a balancesheet driven financial as well as real crisis. At mid-range-values of e where investment reacts strongly to exchange rate changes, these negative balance sheet effects may outweigh the positive competitiveness effects (I e > N X e ). This will cause the goods market curve to bend backward for such exchange rate changes. In the case of extraordinarily high or low values of e, where investment is not that sensitive to changes in the exchange rate, the competitiveness effects however outweighs the balance sheet effects (N X e > I e ). In this case the goods market curve is upward sloping. Using the Implicit Function Theorem, we can derive the slope of the IS curve analytically:
We assume (2) is negative. Hence, Y e is upward sloping if N X e > I e and backward bending otherwise.
The financial sector in this model is represented by the financial markets equilibrium curve (AA curve). The AA relation consists of the following equations:
Expected rate of depreciation: ε = β ε (
Private Wealth:
Demand for foreign bonds:
Demand for domestic bonds:
Foreign exchange market:
Equation (3) defines the risk premium ξ as the difference between domestic and foreign rates of return on bonds, i.e., by the difference between the domestic interest rate and the foreign one, the latter augmented by the expected rate of currency depreciation. Equation (4) defines the expected rate of currency depreciation, making use of a standard regressive expectations mechanism as it is extensively used in
Rødseth (2000), with ε e ≤ 0 and ε(e 0 ) = 0 for the steady state exchange rate level e 0 . Economic agents have perfect knowledge of the future equilibrium exchange rate and therefore expect the actual exchange rate to adjust to the steady state value after the occurrence of a shock. Flaschel and Semmler (2006) describe these ex-pectations, allowing agents to behave forward looking, as asymptotically rational.
This assumption ensures that obtained instability is not caused by the expectations formation process, but due to other forces in the model of this paper. Equation (5) defines initial private sector wealth as a portfolio of domestic money M 0 , domestic bonds B 0 , and foreign bond holdings eF p0 . Equations (6), (7), and (8) present the three asset demand equations of the private sector. Equation (9) is the equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange market where the total amount of foreign bonds held in the domestic economyF * equals domestic private foreign bond holdings eF p plus the central bank's foreign bond holdings F c . We assume as in Rødseth (2000) that domestic bonds cannot be traded internationally which implies that the foreign bond holding in the domestic economy is only changed (sluggishly) through imbalances in the current account (and not by international capital movements).
Inserting equation (3) and equation (5) in equation (7) gives the financial markets equilibrium curve (AA curve):
Note that in a flexible exchange rate regime the central bank need not intervene on the foreign exchange market, i.e., F p can be considered a given magnitude in such a case. The slope of the AA curve is determined by the Implicit Function Theorem:
The AA curve is downward sloping since There are then two equilibria on the upward sloping segments of the IS curve (E 1 and E 3 ) and one equilibrium on the backward bending segment of the IS curve (E 2 ).
In equilibrium E 1 and E 3 the competitiveness effect dominates the balance sheet effects (N X e > I e ), whereas in equilibrium E 2 the balance sheet effect dominates the competitiveness effect (I e > N X e ).
In order to study the stability of the system the Jacobian matrix is derived:
and ε e ≤ 0, we obtain the following signs:
The stability of the equilibria (E 1 , E 2 , E 3 ) depends on the sign of '?' in the Jacobian and therefore on the question which effect (N X e or I e ) dominates the other one.
As we already mentioned, in equilibrium E 1 and E 3 the IS curve is upward sloping and N X e > I e holds. In this case the '?' has a positive sign. The determinant of the Jacobian is positive (det(J (E 1,3 ) ) > 0) and the trace is negative (tr(J (E 1,3 ) ) < 0).
Equilibrium E 1 and E 3 are stable. Yet, equilibrium E 2 is unstable since I e > N X e which results in a negative sign of '?'. With a negative '?', the determinant 7 and the trace of the Jacobian are both negative (det(J (E 1,3 ) ) < 0 and tr(J (E 1,3 ) ) < 0).
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The three equilibria presented in Figure 2 represent three different states of the economy. Equilibrium E 1 stands for the stable 'good equilibrium' with high output and a low exchange rate. E 2 represents the fragile intermediate equilibrium,
9
and E 3 is the stable 'crisis equilibrium' with low output and a high exchange rate.
7 Since the slope of the IS-curve is less negative than the slope of the AA-curve.
8 For more details on such a stability analysis see the 'trace-determinant plane' in Hirsch, Smale and Devaney (2004, p. 63) .
9 A saddlepoint with unstable arms running towards the two stable equilibria.
Introducing linear hedging and speculation
In this section we give firms an instrument to influence their investment's sensitivity to exchange rate movements. As already mentioned above, a rise in e (i.e., a depreciation of the domestic currency) will increase the value of foreign currency denominated debt in terms of the domestic currency. If the debt has to be settled, or if specific debt payments occur after the devaluation, the firm incurs a loss. Moreover their balance sheet and the implied net worth of firms may be considered as measure of the credit-worthiness of firms and lead to credit rationing in cases where large depreciations occur. By contrast, in the case of an appreciation of the domestic currency, the value of the debt of firms is reduced and their credit worthiness increased. Figure 3 illustrates the value of a single payment depending on the exchange rate. 
I(e) if f irms do not hedge at all (f
In order to analyze speculation we have to allow for negative values of f 
Simulation studies of the model
In this section we simulate the model in order to get more insights into the mechanisms that determine the model's outcomes. We will concentrate on the interaction between investment and net exports, and therefore on the slope of the IS curve.
We here define the investment function by
We set I(e 0 ) = 0, b 1 = 100, and b 2 = 0.1. Next, we introduce this investment function into the IS curve of the model:
with a 1 * e 3 representing net exports. 
Hedging activity
In this section we investigate the impact of corporate hedging on economic stability.
In the context of our model, we allow f d to range from 0 to 1. Moreover, we set c f = 0. We will discuss the role of futures trading costs in a later section. the IS curve is still nonlinear. This is due to our definition of net exports. However, in the case of a perfectly hedged investment function, the IS curve slopes strictly upwards. There is no backward bending segment and therefore, there are no multiple equilibria. To make this point more obvious, we introduce a very simple representation of the AA curve into the model. Again, we focus on the 'Y-e interface' and ignore all other influences. As we assume the AA curve to be linear and downward sloping, we define the AA curve simply as e + Y = 0. Moreover, this formerly fragile equilibrium is now stable since N X e + I e ≥ 0 (i.e.
the IS curve does not bend backward). 
Speculation
In this section, futures demand f increases. This leads to the possibility of more severe recessions but also to the possibility of larger economic booms. Note that, again, we set futures trading costs equal to zero. We will discuss their role in the next section. 
Futures trading costs
Thus far we have set futures trading costs to zero. In this section we discuss the role of futures prices in the case where firms use futures to hedge their currency exposure. Note that, "A 'futures price' is something of a misnomer, for it is not a price at all." Figure 16 compares the IS curve without hedging to a perfectly hedged IS curve with c f = 200.
13 Duffie (1989, p. 11) . 
Private asset allocation and capital flight
In the previous sections we investigated the role of firms' risk management and investment strategies on economic stability. We therefore focussed on the goods market equilibrium curve. We assumed that firms can manage their exposure to currency risk and hence influence their investments' sensitivity to exchange rate changes.
Here we now pay attention to the risk of private asset holders. We introduce a new parameter α into the financial markets equilibrium curve which represents this risk of private asset holders:
If there is a depreciation of the domestic currency (i.e., e increases) the value of foreign bonds demand eF We assume that households do not have access to futures markets to deal with this risk. The only possibility for households to avoid the risk is to reallocate their asset holdings from domestic into foreign bonds. Flaschel and Semmler (2006, p. 17) note that this process of reallocation "may be considered as capital flight from the domestic currency into the foreign one," here still confined to the behavior of 14 For more details see Flaschel and Semmler (2006) . domestic households only. Therefore, the system moves to the new crisis equilibrium (D).
Although the shock pushing the system towards the crisis equilibrium (D) shows up in the AA curve, the main cause of the crisis is, again, the sigmoid nonlinearity in the goods market equilibrium curve. Therefore, Figure 18 presents the effect of an increase in the risk parameter α in the case of a perfectly hedged economy (f d = 1).
Here, an increase in α leads to a depreciation of the domestic currency, but also to output expansion due to positive competitiveness effects which in turn lead to a trade surplus (i.e., N X e > 0 and N X e > I e since I e = 0 in the perfectly hedged economy). Hence, corporate hedging does not prevent the domestic currency from depreciating. However, there is no output loss in the perfectly hedged economy. 
Conclusions
In this article we investigated the role of firms' risk management strategies (i.e. risk reduction or risk taking) in balance-sheet triggered currency crises. We modelled a direct linkage between microeconomic risk management and macroeconomic stability in a flexible exchange rate regime and found that corporate risk management can substantially affect economic stability. The conclusions we obtain are at the expense of relatively strong assumptions on the underlying model. Firms rely on debt denominated in foreign currency. They know their currency risk exposure and have the required skills and access to futures markets to deal with their exposure.
Another strong assumption concerns the futures markets. Linear financial derivatives like currency futures are the only risk management vehicles discussed in this investigation. These futures contracts exactly meet the firms' requirements regarding timing and contract size. Therefore, these contracts allow firms to perfectly hedge their currency exposure. Although this is possible, it might not be in the best interest of the firms.
An advantage of this model is its flexibility. We can study different types of futures trading, from the minimization of the underlying risk (i.e., a perfect hedge) to additional risk taking (i.e., speculation) in futures markets. Although our analysis is not based on empirical data, the main intuition of our results is robust. In particular, futures trading (or derivatives trading in general) has real effects, at least to the extend that futures trading affects the exposure of firms' cash flows to specific risky variables. Controlling these exposures has direct effects on a firm's investment strategy and therefore on output.
